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ABSTRACT With the integration of the advanced computing and communication technologies, smart grid
system is dedicated to enhance the efficiency and the reliability of future power systems greatly through
renewable energy resources, as well as distributed communication intelligence and demand response. Along
with advanced features of smart grid, the reliability of smart grid communication system emerges to
be a critical issue, since millions of smart devices are interconnected through communication networks
throughout critical power facilities, which has an immediate and direct impact on the reliability of the entire
power infrastructure. In this paper, we present a comprehensive survey of reliability issues posted by the
smart grid with a focus on communications in support of neighborhood area networks (NAN). Specifically,
we focus on network architecture, reliability requirements and challenges of both communication networks
and systems, secure countermeasures, and case studies in smart grid NAN. We aim to provide a deep
understanding of reliability challenges and effective solutions toward reliability issues in smart grid NAN.
INDEX TERMS Smart grid, neighborhood area network, reliability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart grid is one of the most critical large-scale
systems which adopt advanced communication technologies
and modern control techniques to significantly improve the
reliability and security of the power grid [1], [2]. It is featured
by its two-way flows of electricity and information, based
on which an optimized energy delivery network can be
constructed [3], [4].
In smart grid communication networks, neighborhood area
network (NAN) offers power distribution with the ability
of monitoring and controlling electricity delivery to each
household, thusNAN fulfills the communication gap between
smart grid wide area network (WAN) and home area net-
work (HAN) [5]. In the network architecture of NAN with
advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), as shown in Fig. 1,
massive metering data is firstly aggregated from thousands
of smart meters located at different homes each with a HAN.
Energy usage data along with metering data are reported to
a local concentrator, which acts as the master gateway of
a NAN, through multiple data aggregation points (DAPs).
Without doubt NAN lies in one of the most crucial segments
in communication infrastructure of smart grid.
However, considering the features of smart grid,
reliability is one of the basic but the most important
requirements for designing such a highly advanced system in
smart grid. A heavy dependence on information networking
inevitably yields the smart grid to potential reliability
issues associated with both communications and networking
systems. This fact truly increases the risk of compromising a
reliable and secure power system. For example, it has been
shown [6], [7] that possible malfunction and network failure
may lead to a cascading impact across communication com-
ponents and a variety of severe consequences in grid systems,
from customer information leakage to a cascade of failures,
such as massive blackout and destruction of infrastructures.
The term reliability means the probability that a system
performs a specified service throughout a specified interval of
time [8]. In communication networks for smart grid, potential
vulnerability of system failures is still in a high rate, while
there exists a risk of malicious cyber attacks to communi-
cation systems. According to the recommended communica-
tion quality of service (QoS) and availability requirements
from U.S. Department of Energy (DoE), the reliability
for smart grid AMI networks is set between the range
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FIGURE 1. A communication architecture for the deployment of smart grid and its utility networks.
of 0.99 - 0.9999 [9]. Therefore, reliability of NAN plays
a critical role in providing assured services in smart grid
communication infrastructures [10], [11], and remaining a
high reliability in smart grid NAN guarantees the availability
of continuous data communication services [12].
As a result, we aremotivated to investigate reliability issues
in the smart grid NAN, which is of critical importance to the
neighborhood area network design and has been considered
as one of the priorities for smart grid communica-
tions [13]–[15]. In this paper, we discuss the reliability
requirements posed by the smart grid NAN and their impact
on communication network design. We provide an overview,
analyze potential reliability challenges, review existing
solutions, and present case studies for communication
reliability in smart grid NAN. More specifically, the follow-
ing topics are discussed in the paper:
• Smart grid communication architecture: We first
describe the fundamental architecture of communication
networks in smart grid, with a focus on NAN and AMI,
followed by communication standards for NAN.
• Communication and system reliability of NAN:
We focus reliability issues which mainly come from
communication networks and systems, we review those
reliability challenges, and provide basics for reliability
analysis.
• Countermeasures and recovery: To efficiently
counter-react reliability issues, it is essential to widely
deploy prevention, detection, mitigation, and recovery
strategies throughout NAN. Therefore, we present some
discussions on existing solutions, including network
design and system defense countermeasures, by
considering applications in smart grid NAN.
• Reliability case studies: Several reliability issues in
NAN are investigated and we provide a comprehensive
analysis for NAN in smart grid, using fault tree
analysis on potential system failures and attack counter-
measure tree to identify specific detection andmitigation
strategies on malicious cyber attacks to communication
systems in NAN. We also conduct a simulation study
that the self-healing ability of NAN is enhanced through
proper topology design. The simulation study evalu-
ates both reliability and networking efficiency of the
communication networks in NAN.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we introduce a fundamental architecture of communication
networks in smart grid. In Section III, we present basic con-
cepts for reliability analysis. In Section IV, we present the
communication reliability issues and challenges for nodes
and links. In Section V, we present the reliability issues and
challenges from the NAN systems level. In Section VI, we
discuss the countermeasure strategies for NAN reliability.
We present case studies and discussions in Section VII.
We conclude the paper in section VIII.
II. COMMUNICATION ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we present a communication architecture in
smart grid networks, with a focus onNAN andAMI, followed
by communication standards for NAN.
A. WAN, NAN AND HAN
According to NIST’s conceptual domain model [16], smart
grid power systems consist of seven domains, including
power generation, transmission, distribution, power
operation, service provider, markets and customer, which are
normally deployed over a large geographical area. The smart
grid communication infrastructure is based on a comprehen-
sive design with heterogeneous communication technologies.
The communication structure between back-haul aggregation
points to the core backbone utility center is carried over
different types of communication networks, such as star,
mesh networks and fiber, wireless networks.
From the perspective of energy transmission, we
present a hierarchical smart grid network structure includ-
ing three domains, i.e. a wide area network (WAN)
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domain connecting power generation, transmission and
distribution systems, a community based neighborhood area
network (NAN) domain, and a smart appliance based home-
work area network (HAN) domain. A brief description of the
three categories is shown below.
• Wide area network provides the communications
among electric utility and substations. Basically, the
WAN consists of bulk electrical power generation
plants, a large number of distributed substations and
transformer equipments, which require real-time
measuring and monitoring to achieve wide area situa-
tion awareness. Hence, the WAN requires to maintain
a reliable high-bandwidth backbone communication
network that handles long-distance data transmission
with advanced sensing and monitoring applications.
In summary, the wide area network connects the
power grid control centers and the data concentrator of
each NAN, and transmits energy data in a high-speed
manner [17], [18].
• Neighborhood area network is described as the
bridge network between customer sides and substations,
where intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) are widely
deployed to control and collect data from nearby data
points. NAN incorporates advanced two-way commu-
nication technologies between NAN concentrators and
smart meters, delivers the information of power usage
and system control with different types of requirements.
In a NAN, the data transmission rate is not as high as
in WAN, while the transmission power is relatively low
for the short range transmission, compared to the one in
a WAN. One of the unique characteristics of smart grid
NAN is that wireless communication technologies, espe-
cially low bandwidth channels, are widely adopted in
NANs. Those channels are highly robust for reliable data
communications, which meets the utility requirements
for reliability and resilience. NAN is also extensively
deployed by advanced metering infrastructure (AMI)
and it is rapidly expanding the range of its application
areas, e.g., advanced distribution automation and inte-
gration of distributed energy resources [19].
• Home area network is mainly categorized in the cus-
tomer domain, with many types of intelligent electric
appliances and smart meters, most of which are usually
installed in buildings and home areas. Home area net-
works support low-bandwidth communications between
home electrical appliances and smart meters. Bandwidth
needs are between 10 and 100 Kbps per device and there
is no urgent need for low latency [9].
B. ADVANCED METERING INFRASTRUCTURE
As illustrated in Fig. 2, AMI creates a two-way
communication network between smart meters and utility
systems, as well as the integration of advanced sensors,
monitoring nodes, and data management systems. AMI
enables the collection and distribution of metering data
information [20]–[23]. One of the core components, meter
FIGURE 2. A communication architecture of AMI.
data management system, handles the huge amount of data
and manages the raw data to create meaningful information
and messages for customers, assisting them in using energy
intelligently.
The selection on communication technology for AMI
mainly depends on the coverage and the number of customers
in a certain area, the availability of the Internet connection,
the expected energy efficiency, scalability, the required data
rate, and the expected communication delay. Fig. 2 shows
an example on communication architecture from residential
areas to data collector units and from data collector units to
meter data management systems in AMI.
C. COMMUNICATION STANDARDS FOR NAN
Several wireless standards, such as IEEE 802.11,
IEEE 802.15 and IEEE 802.16 are recommended to be
adopted in smart grid NANs [24]. Among all the IEEE
standards, two IEEE communication standards are more
favorable in NAN, IEEE 802.11s and IEEE 802.15.4g.
802.11s is an amendment for mesh networking and it
addresses some issues on networking of smart grid NANs.
802.15.4g specifies physical layer (PHY) and MAC layer
architecture of smart grid communication networks.
1) IEEE 802.11s
IEEE 802.11s is a standard which is recommended for smart
grid NANs [25], [26]. Initially, IEEE 802.11s was derived
from the family of IEEE 802.11 standard, the goal of which is
to create an amendment to extend IEEE 802.11MACprotocol
for wireless mesh networks (WMNs). One of the most impor-
tant features of IEEE 802.11s is to support frame delivery and
route selection at media access control (MAC) layer through
radio aware metrics [17]. Aside from the revision towards the
MAC protocol, the PHY layer of IEEE 802.11s remains the
same as the IEEE 802.11, thus the data transmission will be
in a high-speed mode. This guarantees a reliable protocol for
high-speed wireless applications in a smart grid NAN.
In the topology of an IEEE 802.11smesh network, a central
gateway is designated and deployed for data transmission to
mesh stations. In this meshed network, access points offer the
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access to end users with either a static or dynamic state, and
aggregated information could also be transmitted to gateways
through multi-hop paths. In this standard, a self-configured
multi-hop wireless network could be formed among wire-
less devices. For routing scheme, the hybrid wireless mesh
protocol (HWMP) is the default routing protocol for
IEEE 802.11s [27].
2) IEEE 802.15.4g
The standard IEEE 802.15.4g [28] was developed by the
IEEE 802.15 Task Groups in 2012, with an achievement
of presenting a PHY amendment and MAC modifications.
Its goal is to specify the requirements of outdoor low data
rate and wireless smart metering utility network (SUN), and
facilitates large scale process control applications in a utility
network. The devices in SUN can operate in an environment
with large-scale and low-power wireless applications [29].
Usually, a SUN contains a large group of outdoor devices
to cover wide areas geographically. Therefore, peer-to-peer
multi-hop techniques are usually adopted to form the com-
munication links between end devices and access points [17].
In summary, IEEE 802.15.4g is a wireless networking
standard enabling inter-operable communications between
certain smart grid devices, including smart meters and smart
home appliances. We can observe that IEEE 802.15.4g is
used mainly for NAN connectivity, while IEEE 802.16 can be
used for WAN connectivity and can relay signals from IEEE
802.15.4g back to utility backbone.
III. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
For information communication technology (ICT) systems,
reliability study is always important. Reliability is charac-
terized as the ability to execute a defined function under
specified conditions for a known period of time [30]. By its
definition, the term ‘‘reliability’’ refers to the ability of an
item to perform a required function, under given environmen-
tal and operational conditions and for a stated period of time.
In the content of this paper, the ‘‘item’’ could be a component,
a subsystem, or a system.
A. RELIABILITY FUNCTION AND FAILURE RATE
The reliability function R(t) refers to the probability that the
unit does not fail in the time interval (0, t] or the probability
that the unit survives the time interval (0, t]. If we denote
F(t) as the probability that the unit fails within the time
interval (0, t], then
F(t) = P(T ≤ t) =
∫ t
0
f (u)du, for t > 0, (1)
where a failure density function f (t) = ddtF(t). In this case,
our reliability function R(t)
R(t) = 1− F(t) = P(T > t), for t > 0. (2)
is presented in this form. Let P(t < T ≤ t + 1t|T > t)
denote the probability that a unit will fail in the time interval
(t, t +1t], given that the unit is functioning at time t, we can
present the variable of failure rate λ(t) as
λ(t) = lim
1t→0












Since we know f (t) = ddtF(t) = −
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dt lnR(t), we can derive from above that the reliability





B. BASIC METRICS FOR RELIABILITY STUDY
Since we already know the relationship between reliability
function and failing rate, our next goal is to find out how
reliability is closely related to the expected time between fail-
ures. In this paper, reliability study always specifies a mission
time duration t . We present the first metric for reliability
study, called Mean Time To Failure (MTTF), which could
also be regarded as the mean functioning time of the item













We then present the second metric, called Mean Time to
Repair (MTTR), which is the average time to restore full
functionality to an item. This metric varies since it may
depend on the time to travel to this item, to diagnose, to
remove, even to isolate and to replace the corresponding
parts. It is obvious that the third metric Mean Time Between
Failures (MTBF) has a certain relationship with them. If the
availability A of an item means the ability to perform the









The relationship between the reliability metrics are shown
in Fig. 3. More reliability analysis will be discussed in the rest
of this paper.
FIGURE 3. Relationship between basic reliability metrics.
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IV. COMMUNICATION RELIABILITY FOR
NODES AND LINKS
Communication network reliability is a basic requirement
for smart grid NAN, which defines the availability of data
transmission links and nodes. Smart grid NAN should have a
self-healing mechanism through proper topology and routing
design, so that abnormal operation of a single node or a few
nodes will not affect the performance of the entire network.
Besides that, common performancemetrics can also be a huge
factor impacting reliability of communication networks.
In this section, we mainly discuss communication nodes
and links towards network failure, as well as the proper
networking design to improve network reliability. As we
discussed earlier, a NAN provides two-way communications
between smart meters and a master gateway, i.e. a data con-
centrator, through multiple DAPs. In this network, the entire
communication topology is comprised of thousands of nodes,
and it is interconnected by various wireline and wireless
links using different communication standards. A single node
failure or a single link failure would degrade a small range
of communication network, thus lower the reliability to part
of a NAN. In dealing with a networking failure for any
communication nodes or links, a NAN should have a self-
healing capability through proper topology and networking
design.
A. RELIABLE NETWORKING DESIGN IN NAN
In smart grid NAN, a mesh network is a flexible network
with the characteristics of self-healing, self-configuration and
high scalability services [31].Wirelessmesh network in smart
grid NAN consists of a group of nodes, where new nodes can
join the group and each individual node can act as an inde-
pendent router. The self-healing advantage of the network
enables the communication signals to find an alternative route
through active nodes, if any node is forced to drop out of the
topology [32]. For smart grid communication network in
North America, RFmesh-based system are very popular [33].
In practice, a good coverage of mesh networking can pro-
vide an enhanced capability of multi-hop routing in urban
and suburban areas. Some companies use mesh networking
for smart grid applications due to the redundancy and high
availability features of mesh technology [34]. A multiple-
gateway mesh network topology for smart grid NANs was
presented in [25]. The authors stated that a mesh network
is required for NANs to meet reliability, self-configuration,
and self-healing requirements of smart grid applications. In a
large-scale NAN, multiple data aggregation points (DAPs)
are needed to reduce network congestion and improve reli-
ability. In this architecture, with IEEE 802.11s, each DAP
forms a tree-based sub-network and a DAP is the root node.
The authors emphasized the features of this network such that
each meter has a separate path to reach gateway and such a
topology can enhance self-healing and self-organization of
the network in emergency situations. However, to acquire this
feature, packet scheduling algorithmsmust be used to support
optimal gateway selection.
B. NODE & LINK FAILURE
In node failure, each wireless mesh network consists of a set
of DAPs and they gather data from a group of nearby smart
meters. If the status of a DAP has changed to a failure mode,
or lost its network connection to the rest of the nodes, this
failure event should be notified to all other active neighbors.
One study [35] suggests that a possible NAN topology would
be a complete fully meshed graph, which makes the graph
structure much more resilient in terms of communication
reliability. This scheme is practically reliable for communi-
cation node failures in the neighborhood networking design,
however, the communication overhead such as routing broad-
cast and discovery would be increased in an exponential way.
In link failure, the wireless link is not as easy to be failed
as the wireline link since the majority communications of
a NAN are based on wireless technology. A wireless link
failure can not occur normally unless either a source or a
destination node fails or is attacked by a malicious adversary.
Moreover, the communication media for wireless equipment
to transmit is based on open air, thus it is not as easy to be cut
out on a physical object as a wireline equipment is. However,
both wireline and wireless communication links suffer from
passive attacks, which will be discussed in the section later in
this paper.
C. GRAPH ANALYSIS
Graph theory analysis is often studied as a first step in
reliability analysis. By using graph analysis, we can model
a NAN as an interconnected graph, rank the priority of each
node and link, and determine the critical components to
model and protect in detail. Through graph theory analysis,
we can identify which nodes and links are crucial
for incident response and need for greatest protection, and
specify the node failure and its corresponding effects in a
simulation model. An undirected graph G = (V,E) is a
mathematical structure consisting of two sets V and E ,
where V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} is the set of nodes and
E = {e1, e2, . . . , el} is the set of edges. Considered a NAN,
represented by the undirected graph G = (V,E), elements
of V can be represented as smart meters, DAPs and data
concentrator, and elements of E can be represented as wired
and wireless communication links.
For graph structures of a NAN, the potential options of
graph types are tree, star, chain, ring and mesh graphs.
However, in order to achieve overall reliability of communi-
cations in NAN, tree, star and chain graphs are not preferred
since tree graph is usually considered as a cheap design
with poor reliability, star graph has only one center node
with a degree larger than 1, and chain graph is basically an
alternative form of tree graph with no node carrying a degree
larger than 2. Ring graph is more reliable with each mode
having a degree of 2 and 1 additional link compared to tree
graph, but it is still not a practical solution. For graph structure
in a smart grid NAN, mesh graph based networks are widely
adopted. In a mesh network, each node has a degree of 2 or
more and it can form a connected graph in which every pair
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of distinct nodes has a path between them. Based on the
graph metric Beta Index β = l/n [36], which represents the
level of connectivity in a graph and the robustness of a graph
structure, we can find out that the Beta Index of a tree graph is
β < 1, a ring graph is β = 1, a mesh graph is β > 1. A fully
mesh graph is resilient with β = (n − 1)/2, however from
a trade-off perspective, the cost is that there are n(n − 1)/2
links to connect n nodes.
For evaluating the robustness and connectivity of network
structure in a NAN, metric like clustering coefficient ccG(vi)
of a node vi in graph G measures how connected a graph is
locally. Given the degree dvi of a node vi,
ccG(vi) =
2y
dvi (dvi − 1)
. (7)
where y is the number of links between neighbors of vi. With
smaller value of ccG(vi), we can mark the communication
node vi being less dependent and reliable from other com-
munication nodes in a specific location in NAN.
Additionally, it is crucial to identify the critical nodes in
NAN, since the attacks and failures on these nodes would
bring the biggest impact. Although there are no fixed ways
to define critical nodes, common approaches can be adopted
as follows.
• Identify the nodes with maximum degree
• Identify the nodes with most networking traffic
• Identify the node and link whose failure will separate the
graph
• Identify the nodes with greatest number of shortest path
• Identify the nodes with smallest clustering coefficient
D. SMALL-WORLD NETWORKS
Small-world networks refer to a class of graphs in which
nodes are highly clustered such that most nodes are
reachable from each other by only a small number of
hops [10], [37]. In communication network reliability study,
work can be explored when the NAN location graph is also a
small network. The goal is to reach most of the nodes using
a small number of hops.
To identify a network being a small-world network, the
general steps are presented as follows. Finding out the degree
of each node will be the first step. Count the number of
nodes with degree of 1, 2, 3, etc, and divide these counts k
by the number of nodes in the entire network. This gives
us the frequency of nodes with a certain number of links.
Based on the node frequency, a histogram can be plotted
starting with the frequency of nodes with 1 link, then 2 links,
3 links, etc. The resulting histogram has a certain shape,
i.e., the frequency counts will decline as the number of links
increase. If the rate of decline approximates the curve (1/k) p,
where p is greater than one, then the network is a small-world
network.
Theoretically speaking, for a NAN location graph with a
small-world behavior, it is possible that packets are delivered
to their destinations through only a small number of nodes.
From this perspective, the idea of small-world network could
be applied to network design and to improve the reliability of
a certain NAN with highest priority.
V. COMMUNICATION SYSTEM RELIABILITY FOR NAN
Communication system reliability of a NAN in smart
grid plays a crucial role in improving end-to-end AMI
communications. From the system perspective, an unreliable
communication system that periodically malfunctions and
fails would degrade the reliability of a power management
system significantly. Communication networks that delay
or drop messages could degrade the system reliability of a
control center.
Besides the system malfunction aspects, power outage
incidents are crises that most electric utilities have faced as
well. When it comes to uncertainty level, network vulnerabil-
ity, various cyber attacks and unpredictable natural disasters
are also the major factors that gain a crucial impact on AMI
for providing unreliable services in a NAN.
For the architecture of NAN, four types of components
would mainly be affected by the following reliability issues
from the system level. A home gateway, i.e., a smart meter,
collects household data and transmits them to a local DAP,
which is also capable of relaying data from other meters.
A DAP station represents a neighborhood gateway node.
A relay station relays data from remote DAPs. A master
gateway, i.e., the data concentrator, is the master access point
of utility backbone. For a NAN in smart grid, main reliability
issues occur within these four categories, namely, a) system
malfunction; b) power outage; c) cyber attacks; d) natural
disasters.
A. SYSTEM MALFUNCTION
By its definition, system malfunction is one type of failures
for computing systems. For a smart grid NAN, most of
the system failures are either in a small range or inside a
single component, and relatively they would not affect the
entire communication networks in a large scale. However a
simple system malfunction could trigger a series of chain
reactions to bring avalanche cascading failures (e.g. power
outage) in smart grid due to the lack of the effective real-time
management.
In order to improve reliability in NAN, efficient risk detec-
tion and mitigation schemes are necessary to reduce the
potential risks brought by system malfunctions. For a simple
system, it should be deployed with a powerful detection
scheme as a redundancy to enhance its reliability. For a
considerably complex system, it is normally equipped with
multiplemodules, e.g. CPUmoduleM1, databasemoduleM2,
sensormoduleM3, · · · , etc, to sustain its functionality.We use
λ and µ as the notations for the system malfunction rate and
the repair rate respectively. In this case, λ1, λ2, λ3,µ1,µ2,µ3
denote the failure rates and repair rates of module M1, M2
andM3 in a complex system respectively. If one of themodule
is in malfunction, the immediate detection scheme would be
effective automatically and the corresponding repair scheme
is then activated for troubleshooting correspondingly.
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As we discussed earlier, reliability metrics can be used
to indicate the reliability degree of system malfunction
and analyze the most available improvement for system
reliability [9]. In this study, reliability metrics mainly include
mean time between failures (MTBF) and mean time to




























Power outage is defined as the loss of the electricity supply
in a certain period. Any failure of short circuits that failed
at power stations, and physical demages in any transmis-
sion or distribution lines can be reasoned for major power
outage events. Most electric utilities have the experience of
power outage crisis. The Northeast blackout in 2003 was a
widespread power outage resulting in a $10 billion loss [38],
based on a report by ICF consulting. Hence, outage detection,
management and restoration are very critical for the
continuity of reliable electricity delivery, QoS and customer
satisfaction.
Recent discussions and activities aim at improving
outage management processes by using smart grid
technologies, specifically the ones adopted in neighborhood
area network. In one case, AMI data integration into outage
management system (OMS) can achieve advanced customer
services, improve OMS reliability, outage notification and
restoration notification [19]. There are several ways in the
integration of AMI and OMS to improve the performance
of OMS, and the advantages brought by the integration are
promising. For example, an outage management process is
usually initiated by an outage report from a customer call.
In the AMI and OMS integration case, the outage notification
message from AMI meters will be sent to the OMS very fast
even if it is not reported by the customer, such as during the
moments when customers are unavailable. In summary, the
integration between AMI and OMS will not only improve
the accuracy of reliability reports, but also reduce the man-
power needed to collect and analyze outages for the reports.
However, to achieve such an integration and improve the
reliability of OMS, we still need to address the requirements
and the challenges.
• Requirements: Communication requirements will affect
all three phases of outage management, detection and
recovery. The main purpose of outage management is to
respond to power outage more quickly, hence to achieve
a latency of 2000ms and 56kbps bandwidth required by
any OMS [9], [19].
• Challenges: OMS still needs to be integrated with other
systems and requires a good quality of data. Further-
more, integration of advanced wireline and wireless
communication networks, high-performance computers
and specialized software applications are essential for an
advanced OMS.
C. CYBER ATTACKS
Cyber attacks remain as one of the biggest issues to system
reliability. In this section, we will focus on the impacts of sys-
tem reliability brought by cyber attacks. In smart grid NAN,
cyber attacks could be mainly categorized as active attacks
and passive attacks [39].
For active attacks, the primary security objective for a
NAN in smart grid should focus on the detection of potential
attack events, mitigation of any current attack events and
recovery of post-attack events. For possible active attacks, it
is evident that a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack is
one of the most dangerous security threats to all components
in NANs. Meanwhile, a secure networking design for routing
protocol is critical for enhancing the resilience and reliability
to system components in NAN. In an open network, poten-
tial routing attacks could be easily conducted by injecting
a false link-state advertisement (LSA) to open shortest path
first (OSPF) routing protocol, which is one of the widely
used intra autonomous system (AS) routing protocol. When
such incidents occur, massive metering data transmissions
would be jeopardized in a large scale, and theMTTR of smart
grid communication systems to such events takes relatively
longer than any other failures. Therefore, it is urgent to build
a complex mechanism for detection, defending against, and
recovery from any cyber attack.
On the other hand, passive attacks to a NAN in smart grid
are not as recognizable as the active ones. Eavesdropping,
monitoring and traffic analysis are very difficult to detect
since those events do not involve any alteration of data. There-
fore during the data transmission, neither the sender nor the
receiver is aware of anymalicious event such as the content of
data messages being read by an adversary. Although most of
the passive attacks could be prevented by deploying strong
modern cryptosystems, the computation overhead for such
data encryption and decryption is relatively high as well.
D. NATURAL DISASTERS
Anatural disaster is amajor event from natural earth incidents
to any critical communication systems. Such disasters would
cause severe life loss or economical loss and damage valuable
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properties within a vulnerable area [40], [41]. In smart grid
communication infrastructures, NANs play an important role
in supporting power utilities and customer communities, and
also fight against natural disasters to reduce their impacts.
Several studies [42] have focused on the impact of natural
disasters that bring power outages and failures on AMI com-
munication systems. Since smart grid NAN lies at the edge
part of the power distribution domain, it is worth investigat-
ing the cause and the effects on a affected NAN by natural
disaster.
In the rest of this paper, we mainly consider the impact
of disasters on the affected NAN and quantify the level of
reliability of communication services during network
failures, explore some effective methods to mitigate the
potential vulnerability on network infrastructures, and pro-
pose an effective solution for recovery from severe disasters.
VI. COUNTERMEASURES TO RISKS
When an incident occurs in a NAN, fast and accurate reliabil-
ity analysis should be assessed as soon as possible. Once this
assessment is done, efficient and effective countermeasures
need to be chosen and the system would start to develop a
protection strategy to prevent the incident going on. In order
to achieve reliability levels that satisfy the industrial require-
ments, a NAN in smart grid should be performed in a balanced
way so that they will function normally and prevent potential
threats efficiently.
With that point in mind, we present the countermeasure
strategies and risk analysis for reliability issues as follows:
A. PREVENTION
Prevention strategy is the very first effective approach which
attempts to minimize the risk of accidental or intentional
intrusions. In this strategy, the main goal is to avoid the
risk, by moving secure systems to hazard-free zone. Possi-
ble approaches to be deployed in NAN include performing
encryption and authentication schemes to pursue confiden-
tiality and integrity, deploying interruption prevention, and
facilitating risk analysis process to secure the networking
environment.
B. DETECTION
Detection strategy is the techniques and programs used to
ensure early detection, interception and response of security
breaches. The status of detection applications should always
be set as monitoring to detect any threat if it occurs.
Intrusion detection and remote intrusion monitoring are nor-
mally deployed in NAN. Intrusion detection systems (IDS)
can work efficiently, however it requires a large amount of
history data for pattern recognition.
C. MITIGATION
The main idea of mitigation is to adopt techniques to reduce
the impact of risk by implementing countermeasures and
control schemes. The goal is to mitigate risks to a mini-
mum extent. Mitigation schemes could be provided from the
perspective of physical protection, cyber security techniques
and network redundancy. One example on network access
control is to separate accidental incidents from deliberate
incidents.
D. RECOVERY
Recovery strategy is a planning and response service to
rapidly restore a secure environment and investigate the
source of the breaches. The goal is to provide means to
recover if threat occurs. An alternative approach is to transfer
the risk to other parties. This may require security level
agreements among utility parties.
VII. CASE STUDIES
A. BACKGROUND
In this case study, we investigate two aspects of smart grid
NAN. One is the reliability of communication system when
it comes to system failure, the other is the risk analysis to a
malicious cyber attack targeting a routing scheme in NAN.
The first step towards reliability study involves designing a
model that helps quantify reliability in terms of key attributes
such as the loss caused by failures and attacks, or the gain
obtained by a reliable countermeasure [43]. Quantitative reli-
ability analysis provides precise measurement of system risks
based on modeling and analysis together with historical data,
and it could assign numerical values to components and
calculate potential loss [8]. The goal of performing such a
quantitative risk analysis is to examine the potential vulner-
abilities and threats to a NAN, and to mitigate risks in a
minimum extent.
B. FAULT TREE ANALYSIS ON SYSTEM FAILURES
Fault tree analysis is a top-down system failure analysis,
which incorporates probabilistic reliability examinations to
construct and analyze fault tree diagrams to system compo-
nents using Boolean logic [44]. In this study, we adopt fault
tree analysis to exam the data collection module to NAN in
smart grid.
In a NAN, massive metering data is generated from thou-
sands of local smart meters and then transferred through
multiple DAPs and finally aggregated by a concentrator. The
concentrator acts as the master gateway of a NAN, containing
a secondary database for temporary data storage and message
integrity check. The effects of incorporating fault tree analy-
sis are demonstrated via the module of data collection, which
is shown in Fig. 4. For a complete data collection module, its
FIGURE 4. System failure model of data collection module.
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FIGURE 5. Fault tree analysis on each failure. (a) Communication node failure. (b) Communication link failure. (c) System malfunction.
failure could be resulted from communication node, link or
system malfunction. In Fig. 4, each sub-incident is connected
through an OR gate to combine all the possibilities.
Potential failures on communication nodes, links and sys-
tem malfunction will impact the reliability of this module
dramatically and may bring a cascading failure to the entire
network, as reflected in the fault tree model. In Fig. 5, each
top node indicates the source event that causes the failure.
Each descendant represents a single fault event, and the com-
bination of them results the likelihood of the occurrence on a
parental event. In this case, AND and OR gates are both the
symbols describing the relationship between input and output
events. The fault tree analysis of failures to communication
nodes, links and system malfunction is shown in Fig. 5a,
Fig. 5b, and Fig. 5c, respectively.
InNAN,most common communication node failures occur
in three components: data concentrator, data aggregation
point and smart meters. As shown in Fig. 5a, DAP failure
mostly occurs from failures of relay points, aggregation node
and sensor batteries. In Fig. 5b, communication link failures
are commonly affected based on the topology design and the
stability of communication technologies. In Fig. 5c, system
malfunction could happen at many more sectors, from one
single component to an integrated system.
Fault tree analysis provides a detailed view of probabilistic
risk analysis of a system in terms of infrastructure reliability.
Not only does this approach present a straightforward
view of both the availability and unavailability of selected
components in a system module, but also it indicates the
time interval of a component failures during one year and the
corresponding repairing time period in hours. However, fault
tree analysis does not incorporate any recovery or defense
mechanism, which is a huge drawback to today’s approaches
in reliability study. Therefore there exists a certain limitation
in adopting this method in terms of defending and mitigating
the system risks.
C. ATTACK COUNTERMEASURE TREE ON CYBER ATTACKS
Based on the security model of attack tree (AT), attack
countermeasure tree (ACT) security model is developed to
take into account attack events as well as countermeasure
events, which are demonstrated in the form of detection
and mitigation mechanism. ACT is a modified attack tree to
include mitigation and detection of attacks, and it quantifies
security in terms of attributes such as the loss compromised
by attacks or the gain obtained from a security counter-
measure [45]. In an ACT, there are three distinct events:
attack, detection and mitigation. For communications in a
smart grid NAN, there exist many types of cyber security
attacks jeopardizing the working order of an AMI. One typi-
cal example of such malicious attacks is the attack targeting
at OSPF routing protocol, by injecting false LSA packets.
In this study, we adopt the method of ACT for a quantitative
analysis. We show an ACT example for false LSA attack
in Fig. 6.
In this ACT, the legend indicates the category of events.
The top event is associated with the set of all mincuts. In order
to seek a feasible solution for reliability study, mincuts of an
ACT represent attack and countermeasure scenarios. Consid-
ering attack scenarios such as sending malicious commands
or altering configuration of a compromised router, the cor-
responding countermeasures would include ‘traceroute’ as
one of the most popular detection mechanisms for spoofed
routing messages, and sequence number randomized as the
corresponding mitigation technique. The top event in an ACT
can be represented as a boolean function 8(X ) of each
leaf node event.8(X ) represents the complementary boolean
function for the ACT in Fig. 6, where X is a state vector
for ACT and xAi is a boolean variable such that xAi = 1
when event Ai is active and xAi = 0 when event Ai is
mute.
Based on this ACT, we can identify that the mincuts are
{(A2), (A12,A111), (A12,A1121), (A12,A1122), (A12,A1123)}.
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FIGURE 6. An ACT example for injecting a false LSA.
The boolean function for this can be expressed as
8(X ) = xA111xA12 + xA1121xA12
+ xA1122xA12 + xA1123xA12 + xA2 . (12)
The attack countermeasure scenarios, i.e., the mincuts,
of the ACT in Fig. 6 are {(A111, D1M1, A12, D12M12),
(A1121, D1M1, A12, D12M12), (A1122, D1M1, A12, D12M12),
(A1123, D1M1, A12, D12M12), (A2, D2M2)}. Each of these
five mincuts represent a combination of certain events which
will result in a successful attack if each of the corresponding
event occurs. For example, an attack will be successfully
launched if both attack events A1121 and A12 occur and both
countermeasure events D1M1 and D12M12 fail at the same
time in the mincut (A1121, D1M1, A12, D12M12).
D. PROBABILITY ANALYSIS IN ACT
In the attack countermeasure scenarios above, we obtain the
mincut sets as one of the feasible solutions. However, it
is important to determine the most critical event in ACT.
Based on the discussed case, we present the event probability
analysis of a successful attack to a single incident as follows.
We denote the probability of a successful false LSA attack
in ACT as Pa, the probability of detecting attack type i as PDi ,
the probability of mitigating attack type i as PMi , the proba-
bility of a undetected false LSA attack in ACT as Pud , and
the probability of a detected but unmitigated false LSA attack
in ACT as Pum. In this case (with countermeasures connected
through an ‘‘AND’’ gate), the general function of a successful




(1− PDi × PMi ). (13)
Fig. 7 shows Pa in a combination with and without coun-
termeasures. From Fig. 7 we can see that Pa value for false
LSA attack decreases with the incorporation of detection
FIGURE 7. Comparison on Pa and probability values of attack of all the
leaf nodes.
mechanisms, i.e. Pa = Pud . With only detection mechanisms
in ACT, mitigation are assumed to be perfect, i.e. they work
with probability one. Therefore with the incorporation of
mitigations (imperfect mitigation) in the ACT of false LSA
attack, Pa increases (Pa = Pud + Pum).
The probability (Pa) of an attack on false LSA injection is
shown in Fig. 8, from the perspective of whether an effect
of a single countermeasure DMi would work for all the
countermeasures. In this ACT example, the probability of
a successful false LSA injection attack Pa would decrease
rapidly as countermeasure strategies being taken effect.
FIGURE 8. Pa against the probability that a countermeasure succeeds for
LSA attack.
E. COST & IMPACT ANALYSIS
Cost can be grouped into two types: cost of attack CA
and security investment cost CSI . In this case study, cost
of an attack for an individual incident can be denoted as∑n
i=1 CAi , and the corresponding impact on that is repre-
sented as
∑n
i=1 IAi . We select the minimum cost mincuts
while computing CA for this case, based on the assumption
that an attacker would launch an attack at its minimum cost.
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Security investment cost for ACT is computed by summing
the security investment cost of countermeasures presented in
the ACT.
As for impact analysis, even though countermeasures do
not affect the impact value directly, countermeasures will
result in reducing the risk which is the real expected value
of impact [46]. In terms of risk to a system, it refers to the
system’s risk to a particular attack scenario. In this case study,
two measures need to be taken into consideration. One is the
impact, i.e., amount of damage that an attack scenario can
affect the system Ia and the other one is the probability of
attack success Pa. Combining the two, the risk to the system
can be defined as the expected value of the impact. The
expression for the system risk R for ACTs is
R = Pa × Ia. (14)
Fig. 9 shows R of LSA ACT against probability of attack
values (ranging uniformly from 0 to 0.5) and impact values
of the NAN (ranging uniformly from 0− 1× 103).
FIGURE 9. Risksystem in the LSA attack scenario.
In this case study, we could also find out the changes
brought by the deployment of necessary countermeasures
significantly. The general function for the decrease in
risk (1RDMi ) for countermeasure (detection and mitigation
schemes) DMi can be given by
1R = RnoDMi − RwithDMi
= (PanoDMi − PawithDMi )× Ia. (15)
F. A SELF-HEALING NAN
According to the smart grid architecture depicted
in Figs. 1 and 2, a NANmay consist of multiple mesh subnet-
works, each of which is managed independently by its local
gateway, i.e., DAP. However, due to the varying nature of the
traffic, some gateways may suffer from more congestion than
others. Under such conditions, nodes belonging to the same
neighboring subnetwork cannot help each other in reducing
the traffic load. In order to allow participation in the routing
scheme, it would be a great advantage to combine all the
subnetworks into a larger network with multiple gateways,
i.e., DAPs, where all the meters can access to any of them.
Additionally, as we discussed earlier in Section IV, such a
plan should enhance the self-healing and self-configuration
abilities of the neighborhood area network if any gateway or
node becomes inoperative.
1) RELIABILITY FACTORS
The first step towards achieving this is to develop flexible
multi-gate routing scheme in such a way that meters can have
an option to choose the best path to one of the DAPs. With
such a routing flexibility together and with the help of an
efficient packet scheduling technique, it would be possible to
enhance network performance. Given the assumption in [25],
we evaluate the networking failure to a DAP in Table. 1.
By reviewing the potential impacts and metrics, the loss of
a DAP node and communication link between a concentrator
and a DAP of NAN will increase the traffic in the local NAN
and its neighbor NAN. Therefore, the increased network
overhead may jeopardize the reliability requirements.
TABLE 1. Effects of networking failure to a DAP.
We developed a simulation for self-healing neighbor-
hood area network consisting of wireless mesh subnetworks,
according to the scenario shown in Fig. 10. In this scenario
each subnetwork is handled independently by its local DAP
before being connected to the data concentrator. In this net-
work, each node will hold a separate path to each of the
gateways. The routing protocol for IEEE 802.11s, i.e., hybrid
wireless mesh protocol [27], has been adopted as the core
routing protocol in this simulation.
FIGURE 10. Multigate routing scheme for a self-healing NAN.
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2) PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We simulate different situations of failure cases, including
one DAP failure as event A, link failure between a DAP and
a concentrator as event B, and the combination of them along
with one single DAP failure as event C .
In this scenario, as shown in Fig. 10, the network consists
of mesh subnetworks, where nodes in each are handled by
their local DAP. In this case, there are 8meters (nodes) in each
subnetwork and meters (nodes) are uniformly distributed
within their coverage area. The simulation results are shown
in Table 2.
TABLE 2. A simulation study on DAP failure.
In the simulation environment for an overall throughput
evaluation of the 3-DAP network, all nodes in the network
generate data packets at variable bit rate (VBR) and the
data is encapsulated into fixed 512 bits user datagram pro-
tocol (UDP) packets. In the PHY, IEEE 802.11b is used
and the data-rate is 2 Mbps, while gateways are assumed to
have an unlimited bandwidth. The noise factor set to 10, as
recommended by IEEE 802.11b. The path loss factor set to 2
and the retransmission limit is 7. Based on the environment,
we evaluate the network performance of the 3-DAP network
in terms of overall throughput versus the input bit-rate per
second per node. Table. 3 shows the results of the 3-DAP
network according our simulation environment.
TABLE 3. A performance evaluation of 3-DAP network.
It is important to point out that due to the nature of the
network, the routing announcement plays an important role in
meeting the self-organization and self-healing requirements
of the NAN. For instance, in the case of a smart meter
malfunction, the root announcement can update the routing
tree by trying to bypass the abnormal nodes.
As soon as a link breakage notification is received for this
path, the source node will send the packet through the second
route, while it updates its tree table to the first root (DAP).
It should be noted that in both methods on-demand routing is
used when a node experiences a link failure.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate the reliability issues of a NAN
in smart grid. We start with the introduction of smart grid
communication architecture, with a focus on the neighbor-
hood area network, advanced metering infrastructure and the
standard technologies deployed on them. We then present the
reliability study. Specifically, we focus on reviewing relia-
bility requirements and challenges of both communication
components and network systems in NAN. By considering
applications in smart grid NAN, reliable countermeasures
strategies are demonstrated for coping with system crisis.
We provide a comprehensive quantitative analysis for NAN
in smart grid, using fault tree analysis on potential system
failures and attack countermeasure tree to identify specific
detection and mitigation strategies on malicious cyber attacks
to communication systems in NAN. In addition, we conduct
a simulation study that the self-healing ability of NAN is
enhanced through proper topology design. The simulation
study evaluates both reliability and networking performance
of the communication networks in NAN, and the results have
shown multi-gate routing could enhance the reliability of the
network.
In our future work, we will continue the study for achiev-
ing high reliability of NAN, from the perspectives of both
communication components and network systems, develop
comprehensive and practical countermeasure strategies to
potential reliability challenges, and design optimal schemes
to achieve high availability to critical system components.
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